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Abstract
Background: This paper has set out to map the state of pharmaceutical regulation in the developing world
through the construction of cross-national indices drawing from World Health Organization data. The last two decades
have been characterized by deep changes for the pharmaceutical sector, including the complete transformation of
intellectual property systems at the behest of the World Trade Organization and the consolidation of global active
ingredient suppliers in China and India. Although the rules for ownership of medicine have been set and globally
implemented, we know surprisingly little about how the standards for market entrance and regulation of pharmaceutical
products have changed at the national level. How standardized are national pharmaceutical market systems? Do we find
homogeneity or variation across the developing world? Are their patterns for understanding why some countries have
moved closer to one global norm for pharmaceutical regulation and others have developed hybrid models for oversight
of this sector? Access to medicine is a core tool in public health. This paper gauges the levels of standards in public
and private generics markets for developing countries building on national-level pharmaceutical market surveys for 78
countries to offer three indicators of market oversight: State Regulatory Infrastructure, Monitoring the Private Market and
Public Quality Control. Identifying the different variables that affect a state’s institutional capacity and current standard
level offers new insights to the state of pharmaceuticals in the developing world. It is notable that there are very few
(none at the time of this paper) studies that map out the new global terrain for pharmaceutical regulation in the
post-TRIPS context.
Results: This paper uses item response theory to develop original indicators of pharmaceutical regulation. We find
remarkable resistance to the implementation of global pharmaceutical norms for quality standards in developing states
and in regulatory infrastructure. Human capacity across many developing countries remains limited. Most notably,
variation among states is stark. Countries that have been leaders in establishing global norms do not appear to have
influenced their neighbors in establishing regional patterns. Finally, in contrast to traditional theories of international
norms diffusion, global standard-setters such as the United States or European Union appear to have surprisingly little
influence on standard setting across our survey.
Conclusions: Our research has implications for the framing of technical support on public health initiatives aimed at
strengthening local public institutions in medicine and offers a new methodological approach for analyzing drug
regulation systems in developing countries.
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Background
The notion that health and access to medicine is central
in human development has become axiomatic across
development and international relations literatures. An
abundance of recent work has focused on the question
of access to medicine, nevertheless, scant research has
looked at the state systems ensuring the quality stan-
dards for that medicine.1 This is particularly notable in
terms of the relationship between globalization and the
emergence of global norms for pharmaceutical quality.
In the area of pharmaceutical regulation almost all
cross-national empirical research has focused on intel-
lectual property (IP) rights, leaving aside the question of
the state’s capacity to regulate the pharmaceutical mar-
ket and variations in regulatory practices across coun-
tries.2 It would be no understatement to note that since
the implementation of the World Trade Organization’s
Agreement (WTO) on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), research on intellectual property and its
effects on pharmaceutical markets has taken on a diluvial
nature. Scholars have written about the process through
which the Treaty was negotiated, [1–3], the resulting
backlash at Doha [4, 5], the increasing “tightening” of the
TRIPS regime [6, 7], the process of TRIPS implementation
[8–11] and the flexibilities pursued under the treaty [12–
14]. While these studies have made important contribu-
tions to our understanding of the global and national
pharmaceutical markets, their focus on drug ownership
rights has overlooked the capacity of states to regulate the
quality of the drugs consumed by their citizens.
Evidence shows however that while countries have
been transforming their norms on IP, they have also
been undergoing profound regulatory restructuring of
their pharmaceutical markets in terms of product regis-
try and regulation. This aspect of pharmaceutical over-
sight, frequently referred to as pharmacovigelence, may
prove to be the next frontier of global public goods ne-
gotiation for access to medicine [15].
This paper builds on a new stream of research in the
global regulation and the access to medicine literatures
by constructing three indices that improve our under-
standing of how pharmaceutical regulation is taking
shape in the developing world. Our research question is
simple: how does the quality of pharmaceutical regula-
tion vary within and across countries? Using item re-
sponse theory to construct indices of three dimensions
of regulatory quality, this research offers the first cross-
national measure of regulatory quality and the first esti-
mate of variation within and across countries.
These indices are based on the World Health
Organization (WHO) Country Pharmaceutical Situation
2011 survey of 78 small and developing countries
(see Addition file 1 for a list of countries). The indi-
ces offer global reach, and key data on the evolving
regulations in developing and least-developing countries.
That said, the WHO survey and therefore, our results, do
have limits: we do not provide a score of how well govern-
ments are in practice regulating these markets—the actual
enforcement of the rules that they may have adopted. This
research lends insight into the de jure variation within and
across countries on three central dimensions relating to
the control of quality in the production and distribution
of medicine. A conceptual and empirical mapping of phar-
maceutical regulatory standards in the developing world
will help us make important strides toward understanding
why some countries have been better able to regulate their
markets and protect consumers. The setting of rules and
norms is critical to protecting the interests of public
health. At the same time, the standardization of good
practices by governments offers civil society as well as
manufactures, distributors, and retailers a pathway for
ensuring transparent guidelines for monitoring and
developing well-functioning public and private mar-
kets for medicines.
The paper proceeds as follows: the Background
section offers a brief review of the access to medicine lit-
eratures and the dynamics of global pharmaceutical
regulation over recent decades, the Methods section de-
scribes the methods and data used to develop our indi-
cies, the Results section introduces our indices and
preliminary results. The Discussion section provides a
brief discussion of these results, highlighting the vari-
ation in regulatory quality within and between coun-
tries, and sets out a pathway for future research on the
causal mechanisms that might account for the patterns
in global pharmaceutical regulation among small and
developing countries as identified in this paper.
Background: advances in theory and empirics of
pharmaceutical regulation
The current global framework for pharmaceutical regula-
tion has undergone a profound transformation over the
past two decades. Implementation of the new global sys-
tem for regulation of intellectual property standards since
the mid-1990s has pushed developing states to establish
new institutions to review, approve, and manage the emer-
ging intellectual property rights system [2, 11, 16]. As a re-
sult, the pharmaceutical sector and its governance has
become a flashpoint for conflict over the ownership rights,
access, and marketing of pharmaceutical products [17].
Recent research has shown that as developing states have
been pushed to implement IP standards, a concomitant
wave of regulation of off-patent products has ensued [18].
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical standards and regulatory sys-
tems across the world remain in many countries fragile,
uneven and highly dependent on aid and technical support
from international donors. The weakness of the regulatory
apparatus in many pharmaceutical markets was recently
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illustrated in a study that looked at least developed coun-
tries. Olsson et al. (2010) found that less than half of least-
developed countries publically funded their pharmaceutical
regulatory agencies [19]. Moreover, many state institutions
with the mandate to approve, review, and regulate pharma-
ceutical products in the survey were found to be highly
dependent on financing from international organizations.
In one-third of the countries studied by Olsson et al., these
activities were entirely financed by one international
source: the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria. Such studies lend weight to a growing scholarship
on the developing world which suggests that quality regu-
lation is inherently tied to a more pervasive lack of local,
democratic control of health systems in developing coun-
tries [20]. Evidence that international institutions are cen-
tral in supporting regulatory agencies speaks to the fragility
and diversity of regulatory models across developing states.
Both the push to regulate ownership of pharmaceutical
knowledge at a global level and the subsequent double
movement of states to examine their regulatory structure
at a local level opens new doors for theoretical and empir-
ical research on regulation of standards for medicine. It is
notable that there are very few (none at the time of this
paper) studies that, in light of the seismic shifts in the
pharmaceutical sector, map out the new global terrain for
pharmaceutical regulation.3 We know very little about the
diversity of regulatory systems and how they are enforced
in the developing world. Which countries now regulate
more rigorously the quality standards for medicines in
their markets and why? Do patterns of adoption in emer-
ging markets mimic those standards in developed mar-
kets? Why are some countries moving toward one global
norm while others appear to build regulatory enclaves,
rejecting global standards, and implementing national
market requirements which are unique? What accounts
for patterns of adherence and resistance to dominant
pharmacological standards?
Although highly uneven levels of regulation persist
across pharmaceutical markets, many scholars studying
global regulatory states point to patterns of diffusion
driven by advanced states [21, 22]. They suggest that key
market players drive international norms. That industri-
alized countries seem to instate and then extend domin-
ant regulatory standards fits both a commercial and
political rationale. Firms operating across borders face
lower transaction costs when, for example, the EU’s
European Medicine’s Agency and the United State’s
Food and Drug Administration share the same standards
for bioequivalency and accept data from the same certi-
fied laboratories [23]. Consumers, be they individuals or
public procurement entities, should in principle, benefit
from the lower costs faced by these firms. A generic
company base in Hyderabad, in theory, benefits when
Brazil has standards equal to those in markets where the
firm already operations because the barrier to market
entrance is lowered. Though there appears to be a “new
regulatory order” of independent regulatory authorities
emerging in mid-level developed countries [24, 25], it is
unclear that the particularly “sticky” pharmaceutical sec-
tor is adopting homogenous standards [10, 26].
At the center of this debate is a longstanding wave of
research that has examined patterns of regulatory diffu-
sion. Scholars have questioned why some countries adopt
similar standards while others resist trends. The pharma-
ceutical market appears to have particularities that distin-
guish it fundamentally from other economies or products.
The political economy of medicine is markedly different,
as economist Daniel Carpenter has eloquently written, be-
cause neither the consumer, nor the regulatory agency can
be entirely sure of the product’s quality. “The most salient
institutional distinction rests in gatekeeping: the necessity
of governmental pre-market review for new products,
where any approval is based in part upon an experimental
(non-market) history of the product” [27]. Moreover, regu-
lators must guarantee the quality of approved drugs that
reach consumers. This makes quality control an essential
aspect of pharmaceutical regulation.
Gatekeeping of pharmaceutical markets has important
political and public health implications. Brazil for example
has been widely heralded for its successful program of en-
suring universal access to antiretroviral medicine since the
mid nineties [28, 29]. Yet, its public production and distri-
bution has relied not only on constant negotiations with
patent holding multinationals [30–32] but also with
Indian and Chinese suppliers of active pharmaceutical in-
gredients in order to manufacture generic production.
This negotiation, and a lack of quality standards for bulk
pharmaceutical suppliers has been costly for the national
program; for some public production facilities, the failure
of the process has resulted in up to a third of all purchases
being lost because of ineffectiveness [33].
The global rules now governing intellectual property
have spurred a new set of challenges for developing
states; these challenges are reinforced by the geographic
distribution of pharmaceutical production and local
institutional and political capacity. A ‘frenzy’ of mergers
and acquisitions activities over the last two decades has
resulted in unprecedented consolidation across all levels
of the global pharmaceutical supply chain [34, 35]. Fewer
suppliers have increased competitive pressure for the
region’s public procurement programs and for local pro-
ducers [36]. At the same time, so-called second-tier sup-
pliers have flooded the international pharmaceutical
market with products which may not meet quality stan-
dards. States face a double-edged regulatory challenge,
harmonizing their intellectual property rights norms to
global standards and working to upgrade and implement
quality standards for local populations.
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Methods
Seeking to map out variation in pharmaceutical regulation
within and across countries, this paper introduces three
indices based on the WHO Country Pharmaceutical
Situation 2011 survey.4 Survey questions directly related
to three central dimensions related to the control and
quality of the production and distribution of medicines
have been identified in order to assess the ability of
governments to ensure the quality of the medicines
consumed by their citizens. The first index measures the
existence of basic State Regulatory Infrastructure. The sec-
ond index assesses the degree of statutory control over
private transactions: Monitoring the Private Market. As
previously discussed, the survey responses do not permit
us to measure how well countries regulate and monitor
their markets since they do not provide information about
how well laws and policies are implemented. What these
indices do allow us to measure is whether countries have
adopted polices widely seen as desirable and positively
associated with ensuring the quality and efficacy of medi-
cines. The third index, Public Quality Control, evaluates
the existence of polices associated with high standards of
control of the public pharmaceutical market.
These three indices do not cover all aspects of
pharmaceutical regulation and monitoring nor all prac-
tices necessary to ensure quality medicines. However,
they include the most basic institutions, policies, and ac-
tions necessary to ensure the safety, efficacy, and quality
of medicines. They also cover the key regulatory func-
tions of licensing, inspection, product assessment, and
registration as well as key policies associated with phar-
macovigilance, all of which have been widely recognized
as central to the protection of public health.5 Each of
these functions relates to a different aspect of the market
of medicines and each must be undertaken to ensure
access to quality medications.
Basic regulatory authorities and policies are essential
to the implementation and enforcement of any phar-
maceutical policy in the public or private sector. The
dimension State Regulatory Infrastructure takes into ac-
count the existence of a national medicines policy and of
a medicines regulatory authority as well as the existence
of established good practices in manufacturing, distri-
bution, and retail. Especially in developing countries,
ensuring access to quality medicines is complicated by
complex and interdependent problems, which are best
addressed using a common framework. A national medi-
cines policy is a first step in identifying and resolving
problems within the pharmaceutical sector. Medicine
regulatory authorities (MRAs), whatever their official
names, are a first step toward to ensuring a strong regu-
lation of the market and the protection of public health;
without a central authority monitoring, testing, and
tracking medicines as well as licensing and inspecting
pharmacists and points of distribution even the best
statues can become ineffective. The publication of good
practices by the government not only provides manufac-
tures, distributors, and retailers a clear guide for action;
it also provides regulators clear guidelines for monitor-
ing the market and for implementing policies that will
help develop well-functioning market for medicines.6
The index State Regulatory Infrastructure uses
fourteen indicators from the WHO survey, which are
detailed in Table 1.
Access to quality medicines can only be ensured by
the presence of a strong regulatory system. Control over
the processes and people involved in the production,
distribution, and sales of medicines requires a legal
framework for licensing, monitoring quality, and phar-
macovigilance. Every modern regulatory system requires
a legislative framework to permit the implementation
and enforcement of policies as well as ensure that rele-
vant actors meet predetermined requirements of quality
before participating in the market. Without licensing re-
quirements the quality of medicines cannot be ensured;
although licensing does not provide proof of quality, it is
an indispensable element. Ongoing monitoring and
Table 1 Composition of State Regulatory Infrastructure
3.01.04 Equal to one if a national medicines policy official document
exists.
3.01.12 Equal to one if pharmaceutical policy implementation is
being regularly monitored/assessed.
3.01.14 Equal to one if a policy is in place to manage and sanction
conflict of interest issues in pharmaceutical affairs.
3.01.16 Equal to one if there a whistle-blowing mechanism allowing
individuals to raise a concern about wrongdoing occurring
in the pharmaceutical sector of your country.
5.01.01 Equal to one if there are legal provisions establishing the
powers and responsibilities of the Medicines Regulatory
Authority (MRA).
5.01.02 Equal to one if there is a MRA.
5.01.04.02 Equal to one if the MRA is a semi autonomous agency.
5.01.10 Equal to one if an assessment of the medicines regulatory
system has been conducted during the five years before the
survey.
5.01.11 Equal to one if the MRA gets funds from regular budget of
the government.
5.01.15 Equal to one if the MRA uses a computerized information
management system to store and retrieve information on
registration, inspections, etc.
5.02.15S Equal to one if legal provisions require declaration of
potential conflict of interests for the experts involved in the
assessment and decision-making for registration.
5.05.03 Equal to one if Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP)
requirements are published by the government.
5.05.07 Equal to one if National Good Distribution Practice
requirements are published by the government
5.05.11 Equal to one if National Good Pharmacy Practice Guidelines
are published by the government
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quality control of all segments of the private market also
plays an important role in safeguarding the quality of
medicines. Not only must quality control check that
products contain the right ingredients in the right
amounts, it must also verify that products are transported
and stored correctly, an especially important aspect of
quality control in hot and humid climates. Pharmacovigi-
lance ensures the safety of drugs consumed within the
market. Given that adverse drug reactions (ADRs) are
common and can often, directly or indirectly, cause death,
every country should have a system in place to monitor
medications for potential side-effects. The detection, as-
sessment, understanding, and prevention of ADRs play a
critical role in protecting public health.
To assess the degree to which each country regulates
the private market for medicines the index of Monitoring
the Private Market focuses on the three dimensions dis-
cussed above to construct a single indicator. Each dimen-
sion incorporates at least eight indicators. Table 2 details
each of the indicators used in each of the dimensions.
Especially in poorer countries citizens’ access to medi-
cines depends on the public health system. For this rea-
son it is critical to assess the degree and standards of
quality control with the public health system. Following
the recommendations of the WHO, the licensing of
pharmacists, public pharmacies, and dispensing points is
an important part of regulation [37]. Public pharmacies
should also be routinely inspected and sampling of
medicines should take place. The quality of medicines
distributed by the public sector depends directly on how
government agents procure them and how they are
stored. Testing public products prior to acceptance and
prequalifying suppliers can play a critical role in ensur-
ing the quality of medicines by reducing corruption
within the public health system. A competitive and
transparent procurement process can also help safeguard
the quality of medicines. Table 3 details the indicators
used to develop the index Public Quality Control.
With our indices of State Regulatory Infrastructure, of
Monitoring the Private Market as well as of Public Quality
Control can broadly review coverage of the key dimensions
of drug regulation identified by the WHO, allowing us to
explore different aspects of the policies that governments
have in place. The aim is to identify variation across small
and developing countries by constructing indices that
measure the underlying quality and character of the laws,
policies, and practices in each country based on their re-
sponses to the WHO Pharmaceutical Situation Report. To
do this we draw on item response theory (IRT) to reduce
multiple observed indicators into latent variables that rep-
resent the three discrete aspects of regulation understudy.
As argued above, the items selected from the survey repre-
sent what are believed to be key and often neccasry apsects
of an effective regulatory system.
One of the problems with trying to measure regulatory
quality is that no direct means of measurement exists.
Much like the underlying quality of a doctor or the
intelligence of a student, regulatory quality can only be
measured indirectly through various indicators. As indica-
tors of pharmaceutical regulatory quality, we have chosen
the presence or absence of specific regulatory agencies,
laws, policies, or practices identified as important by the
WHO. IRT allows us to measure an underlying unobserv-
able trait (the quality of the regulatory system) by estimat-
ing the relationship between the unobservable trait (latent
variable) of interest and the probabilities of specific
responses to specific items. To construct our indices, we
use IRT to estimate the relationship between regulatory
quality and responses to the survey questions listed in
Tables 1, 2 and 3. In its simplest form, by using IRT we
posit that the probability of a given country with a given
regulatory quality responding positively to a given survey
item is conditioned by the regulatory quality of the coun-
try and by the specific properties of the regulatory system
that the item represents. By measuring the observed co-
variance among responses of numerous countries to items
with different characteristics, ITR can discriminate be-
tween countries and estimate the underlying regulatory
quality of the country. This allows IRT to discriminate
between countries in the same way that a teacher uses
different types of questions and questions of different
difficulties to evaluate students. After all, having legal
provision for the promotion of medicines is not the same
as the publishing a summary of product characteristics,
the former tells us much more about the underlying
quality of pharmaceutical regulation. Nor is having a
semi-autonomous Medicines Regulatory Authority (MRA)
the same as having a MRA with guaranteed funding, in
developing countries guaranteed funding is much more
difficult to achieve.
Using IRT has two important benefits. First, IRT allows
the data to provide the weights assigned to each item
within the indices (how much each item discriminates
between countries). This frees us from arbitrarily assign-
ing weights to each question within the survey when
constructing the indices. Moreover, since there is no
clear theoretical or normative theory from which we can
derive weights, doing so, or weighing each question
equally could significantly bias the resulting indices and
the ranks of the countries within it. Second, the method-
ology used provides greater information about the
uncertainty of the final index value for each country.
Rather than providing a simple point estimate, as most
indices do, we acknowledge the uncertainty in our
model and provide this information so that others can
take it into account in their own work.
This paper uses Bayesian sampling methods to esti-
mate and item response model for each of the proposed
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indices. In order to map each country’s observed re-
sponses onto the latent variable, we assume that X
denotes a N*J matrix of observed responses to the J
survey questions by N countries. We further assume that
the elements of X are derived from a N*J matrix X*
latent variables and a collection of cut points that distin-
guish between responses. Setting j = 1,…,J index of ob-
served response variables and i = 1,…,N index of
Table 2 Composition of Monitoring the Private Market
Legal Framework
5.02.08 Equal to one if medicines registration always includes the
INN (International Nonproprietary Names).
5.02.12S Equal to one if legal provisions require publication of a
Summary of Product Characteristics (SPCs) of the medicines
registered.
5.05.01 Equal to one if legal provisions exist requiring manufacturers
to be licensed
5.05.02 Equal to one if legal provisions exist requiring both
domestic and international manufacturers to comply with
Good manufacturing Practices (GMP)
5.05.05 Equal to one if legal provisions exist requiring wholesalers
and distributors to be licensed
5.05.06 Equal to one if legal provisions exist requiring wholesalers
and distributors to comply with Good Distributing Practices
5.05.08 Equal to one if legal provisions exist requiring pharmacists
to be registered
5.05.09 Equal to one if legal provisions exists requiring private
pharmacies to be licensed.
5.07.01 Equal to one if legal provisions exist to control the
promotion and/or advertising of prescription medicines
Inspection of Supply Chain and Distributiona
5.03.05.01 Equal to one if local manufactures are inspected for GMP
compliance.
5.03.05.02 Equal to one if private wholesalers are inspected.
5.03.05.03 Equal to one if retail distributors are inspected-
5.03.05.05 Equal to one if pharmacies and dispensing points of health
facilities are inspected.
Inspections Equal to one if manufactures, retail distributors, and
pharmacies and dispensing points of health facilities are
inspected at least every three years.
Or
Equal to one if either manufactures, retail distributors, or
pharmacies and dispensing points of health facilities are
inspected at least every year.
5.04.02 Equal to one if legal provisions exist allowing the sampling
of imported products for testing
5.04.03 Equal to one if legal provisions exist requiring importation
of medicines through authorized ports of entry
5.04.04 Equal to one if legal provisions exist allowing inspection of
imported pharmaceutical products at the authorized ports
of entry.
5.05.04 Equal to one if legal provisions exist requiring importers to
be licensed
Pharmacovigilance
5.10.01 Equal to one if there are legal provision that provides for
pharmacovigilance activities as part of the MRA mandate.
5.10.02 Equal to one if legal provisions exist requiring the
Marketing Authorization holder to continuously monitor
the safety of their products and report to the MRA
5.10.03 Equal to one if legal provisions about monitoring Adverse
Drug Reactions (ADR) exist in your country
5.10.22S Equal to one if there training courses in pharmacovigilance.
5.10.05 Equal to one if an official standardized form for reporting
ADRs is used.
Table 2 Composition of Monitoring the Private Market
(Continued)
5.10.06 Equal to one if a national ADR database exists.
5.10.10 Equal to one if there a national ADR or pharmacovigilance
advisory committee able to provide technical assistance on
causality assessment, risk assessment, risk management,
case investigation and, where necessary, crisis
management including crisis communication.
5.10.16S Equal to one if ADR database is computerized.
aSeveral continuous variables (e.g. How many samples were taken in the last
two years) were discarded due to what seemed invalid values
Table 3 Composition of Public Quality Control
5.03.05.04 Equal to one if public pharmacies and stores are inspected.
5.03.05.05 Equal to one if pharmacies and dispensing points of health
facilities are inspected.
5.05.08 Equal to one if legal provisions exist requiring pharmacists
to be registered.
5.05.10 Equal to one if legal provision exist requiring public
pharmacies to be licensed.
5.06.04.01 Equal to one if quality monitoring in the public sector exists
(routine sampling in pharmacy stores and health facilities).
5.06.04.06 Equal to one if there is testing of public program products
prior to acceptance and/or distribution.
7.01.03 Equal to one if public sector requests for tender documents
are publicly available.
7.01.04 Equal to one if public sector tender awards are publicly
available.
7.01.05 Equal to one if there is a system to prequalify suppliers.
7.01.07S Equal to one if there is a written public sector procurement
policy.
7.01.10S Equal to one if a process exists to ensure the quality of
products procured.
7.01.11S Equal to one if a list of samples tested during the
procurement process and results of quality testing are
available.
7.01.12.01S Equal to one if tenders are national competitive.
7.01.12.02S Equal to one if tenders are international competitive
tenders.
7.02.03 Equal to one if there are national guidelines on Good
Distribution Practices (GDP)
7.10.10.01S Equal to one if the quality assurance process includes
prequalification of products and suppliers.
7.10.10.02S Equal to one if explicit criteria and procedures exist for
prequalification of suppliers
7.10.10.03S Equal to one if a list of prequalified suppliers and products
is publicly available.
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observations, the association between the observed
values X and the latent values X* is modeled using a fac-
tor analysis model:
Xi ¼ Λϕi þ ei i ¼ 1;…:; n
where Λ is a J × K matrix of discrimination scores (factor
loadings), ϕiis a K vector of factor scores unique to each
observation i, and ei represents a J vector of disturbances
(see Quinn 2004 for further explanation).7
Using Bayesian sampling methods, we estimate an
item response model for each of the three dimensions of
pharmaceutical regulation identified above:
1) State Regulatory Infrastructure
2) Public Quality Control.
3) Monitoring the Private Market with:
a. at least regular inspections
b. at least annual inspections
Results
The item response model estimates the underlying quality
of the regulatory structure of each country (our indices: ϕ),
for each of the three dimensions, as well as the discrimin-
ation and difficulty scores of each survey item used to con-
struct the index. The discrimination scores measures the
degree to which “better” regulatory structures have a posi-
tive score on the item. For example, whether or not a gov-
ernment publishes its good manufacturing practices
(GMP) requirements has a particularly high discrimination
score, while whether or not the MRA is semi-autonomous
agency has a relative low discrimination score. This sug-
gests that countries with high levels of State Regulatory In-
frastructure are much more likely to publish their GMP
requirements, but they are not necessarily more likely to
have a semi-autonomous MRA. This does not mean that a
semi-autonomous MTA does not produce better regula-
tory results. Rather, it suggests that both good and bad
regulatory systems can have semi-autonomous MRAs. As
such, the presence of a semi-autonomous MRA does not
provide much information about the quality of the regula-
tory system.
The difficulty score measures the difficulty of each item
for all of the responding countries. The difficultly score
takes on both positive and negative values and suggests
the likelihood that most countries response positively on
the item. While we might assume that having a lot of diffi-
cult items in our index would better discriminate between
countries, there is no direct relationship between difficulty
scores and the level of discrimination. Often very “easy”
attributes can be highly discriminatory; for example, surgi-
cal hand scrubbing is a very easy act and, at the same time,
clearly discriminates between good and bad surgeons.
Although the difficulty level does not have a direct
association with the quality of regulation, it is important
that any index constructed from numerous elements
should have a range of item difficulties (Baker 2001). This
allows all countries within the sample to have in place at
least some of the regulatory “goals” and, therefore, allows
the establishments of a meaningful lower value of the
index. Less difficult items allow us to discriminate be-
tween mediocre and poor quality regulatory systems.
As can be seen in Table 4, the difficulty estimates for
the fourteen items that make-up the State Regulatory
Infrastructure index range from −0.84 to 1.38.8 The
range of difficultly indicates that the index is composed
of easy and difficult items. Although the difficulty of an
Table 4 Posterior density of the measure of Regulatory





GMP requirements are published
by the government (5.05.03)
1.89 0.08
(0.72) (0.30)




Government publishes National Good
Pharmacy Practice Guidelines (5.05.11)
1.50 −0.84
(0.57) (0.31)
Government publishes National Good
Distribution Practice Guidelines (5.05.07)
1.23 −0.76
(0.46) (0.27)
An MRA exists (5.01.02) 1.20 1.34
(0.42) (0.32)
Legal provisions establish the power
and responsibilities of the MRA (5.01.01)
1.14 1.38
(0.39) (0.31)








Declaration of potential conflict of
interests of experts (5.02.15S)
0.75 −0.25
(0.27) (0.18)




Policy exists to manage and sanction
conflict of interest (3.01.14)
0.56 −0.45
(0.23) (0.17)
An assessment of the regulatory system was




is being regularly monitored (3.01.12)
0.45 −0.06
(0.21) (0.16)
MRA is a semi autonomous agency (5.01.04.02) 0.36 −0.71
(0.23) (0.17)
Notes: Entries without parentheses are posterior means and entries with
parentheses are posterior standard deviations. The parameters were estimated
using the MCMCmixfactanal in the MCMCpack in R3.1.2. Items are ordered by
the degree of discrimination. Estimations with a significant portion of their
posterior mass to the left of zero are in italic and placed last
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item and its discriminatory value are not directly related,
it is interesting to note that two of the items that were
most likely to be answered positively (low difficulty
scores): whether the government published National
Good Pharmacy Practice Guidelines and National Good
Distribution Practice Guidelines, also have high discrim-
ination scores. In a sense, we can think of this as surgical
hand scrubbing, it is an easy, but necessary step for a
good regulatory system.
High discrimination scores are directly associated with
better regulatory characteristics. Three of the variables
with the highest discrimination scores have a direct rela-
tionship with the publication by the government of good
practice guidelines (5.05.03, 5.05.07, and 5.05.11). The
variable with the second highest discrimination scores
takes into account whether the MRA uses a computer-
ized information management system. Although the
publication of guidelines or having a computerized infor-
mation management system may seem less important
than having a national medicines policy or a medicines
regulatory authority, the higher discrimination scores of
this variable should not be taken to mean that these ac-
tions (variables) are more important than other actions.
The publication of these guidelines usually emerges from
the implementation of a national medicines policy and a
causal relationship would seem to exist between the two.
However, not all countries with a national medicines
policy have taken the time or have the ability to develop
good practice guidelines. The discrimination scores on
the variables associated with the publication of good
practice guidelines can be interpreted as the benefit
accrued by developing and publishing core criteria for
the pharmaceutical market, after establishing a national
medicines policy. At the same time, it is little use to have
good policies on the books if regulators cannot easily
track licenses, registration, medicines, etc. through a
modern computerized information management system.
Whether the government published GMP requirements
and whether the MRA uses a computerized information
management system have the two highest discrimination
scores. These high scores indicate that the governments
with the best underlying regulatory infrastructures have
these elements. On the other hand, whether the MRA is a
semi-autonomous agency has a very low discriminatory
value. The high standard deviation of this item indicates
that it may have an “insignificant” relationship with the
degree of regulatory infrastructure. In some ways this
makes sense, although a semiautonomous agency may be
better able to resist political pressure, it is not a guarantee
that the agency and its regulators will have the legal
provisions or resources necessary to regulate the highly
complex pharmaceutical market.
While the discrimination and difficultly scores of the
items used to construct the index provide information
on the overall patterns of association among the re-
sponses within the index, they do not provide clear in-
formation about which countries have better underlying
regulatory structures. One of the advantages of estimat-
ing a Bayesian model is that it provides us with point
estimates (ϕ) for regulatory quality (the latent factor) for
each country, which allows comparison across countries
and groups of countries. Figure 1 presents the estimated
ϕs for the State Regulatory Infrastructure index. Inter-
preting the ϕs as a measure of the regulatory infrastruc-
ture in the pharmaceutical sector we see that Morocco,
Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Egypt ranked highest
among the countries within the survey (see Fig. 1).
Among the countries with the lowest score are the
Central African Republic, Lesotho, and numerous small
island nations.
Estimating a Bayesian model also has the advantage of
providing uncertainty estimates for our estimated ϕs.
Quinn (2004) points out that the marginal 90 % credibility
intervals for the estimated scores can be misleading due to
the positive correlation between the estimates ϕs of coun-
tries [38]. To estimate the the differences that exist be-
tween the ϕs of different countries, even though their
credibility interval overlap, we can evaluate the probability
that country a has a higher score than country (ϕa > ϕb).
For instance, in Fig. 1, the posterior probability that
Morocco has a higher latent factor score (ϕ) than Saudi
Arabia (ϕMorocco > ϕSaudi Arabia) is 50 % and the probability
that Morocco has a higher score than Panama is 77 %.
Similarly the probability that ϕMorocco > ϕTurkey=95 %, the
probability that ϕSaudia Arabia > ϕTurkey= 94 %, and the
probability that ϕPanama > ϕTurkey= 82 %.
We can also calculate the probability that a country of
a group of countries have the highest (lowest) scores. In
the case of Morocco, there is a 24 % probability that it
has the highest score among all the countries and there
is a 49 % probability that either Morocco or Indonesia
have the highest score among all of the countries. Com-
paring Morocco and Indonesia against Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, and Liberia we find a 59 % probability that either
Morocco or Indonesia have a higher score than any of
the three former countries. In the case of São Tomé and
Principe there is a 35 % probability that the country has
the lowest score of all the countries. However, when we
compare São Tomé to only Dominica and Saint Lucia
there is a 48 % that its score is lower than those of the
other two countries.
These results may seem contrary to accepted percep-
tions of how well these countries regulate their pharma-
ceutical markets in comparison to the other countries
within the survey. For example, neither Liberia nor
Namibia are considered to regulate their pharmaceutical
markets well [39, 40]. However, both countries have taken
great strides to establish a strong regulatory infrastructure
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and legal framework, which would give them a high de
jure rating. Both countries lack the resources and capacity
to provide the regulatory oversight [40, 41]. These two
cases highlight the importance of differentiating between
de jure regulatory system and the overall quality of
pharmaceutical regulation. In general, however, our results
match much of that we know about the regulatory quality
and capacity of states. For instance, both Indonesia and
Saudi Arabia are known for having a strong institutional
foundation for effective regulation of medicines [41–45].9
Similarly, the regulatory capacity of Dominica, St Kitts
and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines
are generally considers to be very weak [46, 47].
It is interesting to note that among the 15 countries
with the lowest score for State Regulatory Infrastructure
nine are small island nations. This may indicate that the
size of the country has a direct influence on the state’s
capacity to regulate its pharmaceutical market.
Several factors need to be taken into consideration
when interpreting these results and comparing them
with other studies or our own perceptions of the regula-
tory quality of a specific country. First, the latent vari-
able under consideration is not how well countries
regulate their market, but whether they have “good” pol-
icies in place. There is an important difference between
having regulations and policies on the books and their
successful implementation. Of course, good policies are
necessary for good regulation, but they are not sufficient.
Second, our current understanding of how well coun-
tries regulate their markets are based on either single
Fig. 1 Quality of regulatory infrastructure (estimated ϕ)
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case studies or the comparison of a few countries, which,
although they provide a rich understanding of the
specific countries understudy (e.g. Ashigbie, 2010:
Ratanawijitrasin and Wondemagegnehu 2002;), do not
provide any means of systematically comparing regula-
tory structures across countries [48, 49]. The cross na-
tional study of pharmacovigilance by Olsson et al. (2010)
is a good example of the lack of matrix for intra and
cross country comparison [19]. Although the authors
have data on pharmacovigilance for 55 developing coun-
tries no attempt is made to clearly distinguish between
and evaluate the regulations and practices of countries.
The text only describes the diversity of pharmacovigilance
policy across countries. As such, although we may feel
that we can rank countries based on case studies and
small-n comparative studies, such rankings are unsystem-
atic, may value different aspects of pharmaceutical regula-
tion differently in different countries, and may be
influenced by the quality of other aspect of the govern-
ment not directly related to pharmaceutical regulation.
What is the significance of this variation for public
health infrastructure? The first contribution of these in-
dices is to show that across a group of least developed
countries there are important differences in which ele-
ments of WHO pharmaceutical standards they seem to
be adopting. Moreover, across a set of key policies in the
Regulatory Infrastructure and Good Practice systems in
developing countries, some policies have a much higher
level of discrimination or difficulty, as illustrated in
Table 4. The second contribution is to identify the spe-
cific practices associated with high regulatory standards.
For example, having published Good Manufacturing
Practices is highly discriminatory. The adoption and
publication of Good Manufacturing Practices, in and of
itself, does not guarantee any level of pharmacological
adherence. What our results show is that the countries
that make this step have a proclivity toward a better
regulatory system in general and system harmonization.
By contrast, public quality procurement systems seem to
be stronger and more harmonized when they adopt
prequalification systems, as illustrated in the results in
Table 5.
Similar to the other indices, the items in the Public
Quality Control index have a wide range of difficulty
scores (between −0.49 and 2.87). Yet, the results of this
index are particularly weighted toward one aspect of
public regulation. Four of the items with the greatest
discrimination scores are associated with the prequalifi-
cation of products and suppliers. Countries that adopt
these norms have better regulatory systems and are
more adherent to the norms set by the WHO. This is a
very interesting result, because it confirms that the past
decade of work with WHO as an interlocutor for devel-
oping countries in the purchase and distribution of
medicines (e.g. through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria) has created an incentive for
countries to adhere to this norm.










Explicit criteria and procedures exist for
prequalification of suppliers (7.10.10.02S)
3.63 0.49
(1.05) (0.51)




System to prequalify suppliers (7.01.05) 1.42 0.50
(0.41) (0.25)
List of prequalified suppliers and products
is publicly available (7.01.10.03S)
1.41 −0.49
(0.46) (0.26)
















Pharmacists required to be registered (5.05.08) 0.40 1.53
(0.27) (0.24)




Pharmacies are inspected (5.03.05.05) 0.29 0.75
(0.20) (0.17)




International competitive tenders (7.01.12.02S) 0.25 0.58
(0.19) (0.16)








National guidelines on GDP exist (7.02.03) 0.14 −0.27
(0.18) (0.15)
Public pharmacies must be licensed (5.05.10) −0.04 0.26
(0.18) (0.15)
Notes: Entries without parentheses are posterior means and entries with
parentheses are posterior standard deviations. The parameters were estimated
using the MCMCmixfactanal in the MCMCpack in R3.1.2. Items are ordered by
the degree of discrimination. Estimations with a significant portion of their
posterior mass to the left of zero are in italic and placed last
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Does the implementation of a prequalification program
result in countries advancing other aspects of public
pharmacological regulation? Or is it that by implementing
other measures prequalification is easier to adopt? A clue
may be found in the fact that Public sector requests of
tender are publically available is the only aspect of the
public tender process that discriminates between coun-
tries. It may seem strange that whether tenders are com-
petitive is non-discriminatory, but whether tender awards
are publicly available does discriminate between countries.
However, public requests for tender is a necessary condi-
tion for any truly competitive tender process. The lower
difficulty scores for Tenders are nationally competitive
and International competitive tenders indicates that many
countries respond positively to these questions even
though they do not make requests for tender publically
available, which would significantly limit the degree of
competitiveness of any tender request. Announcing tender
requests publically limits the ability of government offices
to target specific companies for tender either in an at-
tempt to promote national companies or in return for
kick-backs. The implementation of a strict prequalification
program, in a sense, duplicates part of the competitive
tender process, but ensuring and setting transparent prod-
ucts standards. A property run prequalification program
many not guarantee the best prices, but it should ensure
that quality medicines reach the public.10
The results of our third index, Regulation and Monitoring
of the Private Market are illustrated in Table 6. The items
in this index have a broad range of difficulty scores (be-
tween −0.60 and 2.29) giving us confidence that the index
has meaningful upper and lower values. Within these
Table 6 Posterior density of the measure of the regulation and monitoring of the private market model









Legal provisions for the promotion of medicines (5.07.01) LF 2.21 (0.70) 2.02 (0.55) 2.15 (0.68) 1.98 (0.54)
Manufactures required to be licensed (5.05.01) LF 2.06 (0.68) 2.29 (0.59) 2.05 (0.67) 2.28 (0.58)
Manufactures must comply with GMP (X5.05.02) LF 1.99 (0.62) 1.54 (0.43) 1.97 (0.61) 1.53 (0.43)
Pharmacovigilance part of MRA mandate (5.10.01) PV 1.75 (0.48) 0.32 (0.28) 1.75 (0.47) 0.31 (0.28)
Private wholesalers inspected (5.03.05.02) SC 1.74 (0.56) 1.36 (0.39) 1.81 (0.58) 1.40 (0.41)
Local manufactures inspected for GMP compliance (5.03.05.01) SC 1.72 (0.51) 0.72 (0.31) 1.77 (0.53) 0.73 (0.31)
Retail distributors inspected (5.03.05.03) SC 1.69 (0.54) 1.36 (0.38) 1.75 (0.56) 1.37 (0.40)
Legal provisions for ADR (5.10.03) PV 1.62 (0.46) 0.05 (0.26) 1.58 (0.45) 0.05 (0.25)
Wholesalers and distributors must be licensed (5.05.05) LF 1.52 (0.54) 2.15 (0.50) 1.50 (0.53) 2.13 (0.49)
Medicines registration always includes the INN (5.02.08) LF 1.25 (0.39) 1.19 (0.29) 1.20 (0.38) 1.16 (0.28)
Official standardized form for reporting ADRs is used (5.10.05) PV 1.17 (0.37) 1.26 (0.30) 1.16 (0.36) 1.26 (0.29)
National ADR database exists (5.10.06) PV 1.13 (0.31) 0.07 (0.21) 1.10 (0.31 0.07 (0.21)
Marketer monitor safety and report to the MRA (5.10.02) PV 1.11 (0.33) 0.05 (0.21) 1.09 (0.32) 0.05 (0.21)
National ADR or pharmacovigilance advisory committee (5.10.10) PV 1.09 (0.33) −0.60 (0.22) 1.10 (0.33) −0.60 (0.23)
Importers required to be licensed (5.05.04) SC 1.02 (0.43) 1.92 (0.39) 0.98 (0.42) 1.89 (0.38)
Points of dissemination inspected (5.03.05.05) SC 0.94 (0.31) 0.90 (0.23) 0.97 (0.31) 0.91 (0.23)
Pharmacies are required to be registered (5.05.09) LF 0.89 (0.30) 0.87 (0.23) 0.88 (0.29) 0.86 (0.22)
ADR database is computerized (5.10.16S) PV 0.87 (0.26) −0.09 (0.19) 0.87 (0.26) −0.10 (0.19)
Training courses in pharmacovigilance exist (5.10.22S) PV 0.85 (0.27) 0.41 (0.19) 0.86 (0.27) 0.41 (0.19)
Distributors must comply with GDP (5.05.06) LF 0.82 (0.26) −0.02 (0.18) 0.80 (0.25) −0.02 (0.18)
Sampling of imported products for testing (5.04.02) SC 0.55 (0.23) 0.64 (0.18) 0.53 (0.23) 0.63 (0.18)
Publication of SPCs of registered medicines (5.02.12S) LF 0.46 (0.21) −0.07 (0.16) 0.47 (0.21) −0.07 (0.16)
Regularity of inspections SC 0.33 (0.11) −0.38 (0.16) 0.63 (0.25) −0.79 (0.19)
Importation only through authorized ports (5.04.03) SC 0.42 (0.21) 0.54 (0.17) 0.41 (0.21) 0.54 (0.17)
Pharmacists required to be registered (5.05.08) LF 0.17 (0.27) 1.43 (0.22) 0.14 (0.26) 1.42 (0.22)
Inspection of imported pharmaceutical products at ports of entry (5.04.04) SC 0.14 (0.20) 0.35 (0.15) 0.12 (0.19) 0.35 (0.15)
Notes: Entries without parentheses are posterior means and entries with parentheses are posterior standard deviations. The parameters were estimated using the
MCMCmixfactanal in the MCMCpack in R3.1.2. Items are ordered by the degree of discrimination. Estimations with a significant portion of their posterior mass to
the left of zero are in italic and placed last. Aspects of monitoring the private market are: Legal Framework (LF), Control and Inspection of the Supply Chain (SC),
and Pharmacovigilance (PV)
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results, legal provisions (LP) play a key role in discriminat-
ing between countries. The four items with the highest
discrimination scores directly measure the presence of
legal provision for the promotion and manufacture of
medicines as well as for pharmacovigiliance activities by
the MRA. Legal provisions are often an under-recognized
aspect of effective pharmaceutical regulation. Although
regulations provide policymakers with more flexibility, le-
gislation established the foundation and framework for
good regulatory measures. As suggested by the results in
Table 6, inspecting manufactures has little benefit if regu-
lators do not have the legal authority to conduct inspec-
tions or sanction infractions.
The results shown in Table 6 indicate that regulatory sys-
tems among developing countries appear to be surging to-
ward harmonization with international standards through
regulation of companies as they register and introduce
their products in national markets. Better regulatory
systems are not those with consumer-level regulation
(through pharmacists or pharmacies) nor international
trade-level regulation (through ports). Better regulation is
indicated by licensing permission to companies, compli-
ance with GMP, and pharmacovigilance, with scant
emphasis on how products ate dosseminated. For example,
we find that whether inspections are conducted on a regu-
lar basis (Regularity of Inspections) as well as Importation
only through authorized ports and Inspection of imported
pharmaceutical products a port of entry have little discrim-
inatory value. Interestingly, restricting ports of entry and
conducting inspections at the port are an important part of
the regulatory arsenal in industrialized countries, indicating
that developing countries may be developing their own
regulatory norms.11
When we examine how these variables play out across
our set of countries, the results may seem counter-
intuitive. Figure 2 presents the estimated scores for each
country for the Regulation and Monitoring of the Private
Market contrasted with State Regulatory Infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia (SAU), Zimbabwe (ZWE), and Cote
d’Ivoire (CIV) share the highest scores for the regulation
of the private market.12 At the same time, these three
countries have very different values for State Regulatory
Infrastructure. While this indicates that there is not a dir-
ect relationship between State Regulatory Infrastructure
and the Regulation and Monitoring of the Private Market,
the empty triangle in the upper left-hand corner of the
Fig. 2 Relationship between regulatory infrastructure and regulation of the private market
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figure suggest that high quality regulatory infrastructure is a
necessary condition for the regulation of the private market.
As such, among countries with the lowest scores for private
market regulation, we find many of the same small island
countries that had very low values for Regulatory Infrastruc-
ture. These include, but are not limited to Saint Lucia,
Seychelles, and Dominica. Among the scoring countries, we
also find the Central African Republic and Lesotho.
Given the importance of a good legal framework and
institutional mandates for the regulation of the phar-
maceutical market, it is not surprising to see a positive
relationship between Regulatory Infrastructure and the
Regulation of the Private Market. The coefficient of de-
termination (R2 = 0.48) between the two indices indicates
a direct relationship between regulatory infrastructure
and the regulation of the private market. Almost half of
the observed variation in the Regulation of the Private
Market can be explained by the quality of the regulatory
infra-structure of the country.
Unlike the Regulation of the Private Market, there
seems to be now relationship between rating for the
Public Quality Control and the quality of a country’s
regulatory infrastructure. Numerous countries that rated
very poorly on the regulation of the private market (e.g.
Dominica, Lesotho, Saint Lucia) have fairly high rating
for the Public Quality Control. The disjuncture between
Public Quality Control and Regulatory Infrastructure can
be clearly seen in Fig. 3. The low coefficient of determin-
ation (R2 = 0.09) between the two indices, does not mean
that no relationship exists between them. If we ignore
Estonia, it would seem that Regulatory Infrastructure
places a lower limit on public quality control (e.g. a suf-
ficient condition). This is most likely because countries
that have taken the time to develop the legal and institu-
tional underpinning for pharmaceutical regulation would
not find it difficult to develop and implement policies to
guarantee the quality of publically procured medicines.
Especially for countries that lack a domestic pharma-
ceutical industry, the quality of medicines can be signifi-
cantly enhanced with relatively little effort by simply
requiring that all medicines and suppliers have been cer-
tified by the WHO Prequalification Program.
As can be seen in Fig. 4, Public Quality Control and
Regulation of the Private Market have no clear association.
Fig. 3 Relationship between regulatory infrastructure and regulation of the public market
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The disjuncture between these two indices may stem from
various factors. First, countries with large private markets
for medicines, especially, essential medicines, may find a
need to carefully regulate private distributors and retailers,
while countries that provide most of their citizen’s needs
through public sources may feel little need to closely regu-
late the private market. This would generate a negative re-
lationship between the indicators in some countries.
However, many countries have robust public and private
markets for medicines (e.g. Bolivia, Dominican Republic,
and Guatemala), which would require regulators to play
attention to both markets. This would generate to clear
relationship between the two indices. Second, the skills
and regulation need to regulate one market are not the
same for the other and it is unclear that significant spill-
over effects would occur. Moreover, as mentioned before,
high levels of quality control within the public sector can
be obtained through the application of prequalification
programs. However, guaranteeing the provision of high
quality medicines in the private market is much more dif-
ficult. Regulating the private market requires the ability
and legal infrastructure necessary to inspect and sanction
producers, distributors, and retailors as well as monitor a
wide variety of medicines from multiple sources for ad-
verse effects.
Discussion
Nearly two decades on from the harmonization of global
intellectual property standards, how similar are drug
regulation systems globally? What policies and proce-
dures signal higher levels of regulatory quality? This
paper has set out to understand and examine variation
in pharmaceutical regulation within and across small and
developing countries through the construction of three in-
dices drawing on World Health Organization surveys of
pharmaceutical oversight. We use this data from 78 coun-
tries to estimate and analyze the regulatory quality of
countries through item response theory. This allows us to
uncover patterns within and across countries to explore
which have moved toward one standard for market over-
sight. The purpose of these indices is not to evaluate what
causes specific regulatory regimes to emerge or what
causes variation within and between states, but to
demonstrate and explore patterns in the variation of
regulatory practices. Three indices: State Regulatory
Infrastructure, Monitoring the Private Market and
Fig. 4 Relationship between regulation of the public and private markets
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Public Quality Control, provide a means of under-
standing the differences in the infrastructure neces-
sary for pharmaceutical regulation as well as how well
governments regulate their public and private
pharmaceutical markets.
Our paper finds extraordinary depth and variance
across global pharmaceutical systems. While it should be
repeated that we do not track these systems overtime, by
weighing the covariance of over 4000 data points, we
can see that while global intellectual property rights sys-
tems lean toward one direction, regulatory systems in
small and developing countries are highly differentiated.
The variance in Regulatory Infrastructure is clearly seen
in Fig. 1 and the variance in how countries regulate their
public and private markets is evidenced in Fig. 3. If the
harmonization of intellectual property rights were
having significant spillover effects on pharmaceutical
regulation, we might expect greater convergence among
countries.
Yet, within the diversity of these systems, some pat-
terns do emerge. Having established that variance is
wide, the first finding is the strong correlation between
regulatory infrastructure and regulation of the private
market. Interestingly, our second observation is a lack of
relationship between regulatory infrastructure and the
public market. Finally, we find that quality regulation of
the public market is highly correlated with the prequali-
fication of suppliers.
The fact that the prequalification of suppliers and
related polices discriminate among public systems is
interesting. In rough terms, this result suggests that
you can rank the regulation of public medicine systems
by whether and how they manage the prequalification of
suppliers. This does not mean that monitoring the
public sector, inspecting public pharmacies, or hav-
ing international tenders are not worthwhile policies.
Rather, the results indicate that both good and bad
systems have these policies and what marks a truly
good public medicines system is obtaining quality prod-
ucts in the first place.
Because the WHO has had as a keystone of its drug
distribution programs a prequalification system, the re-
sults provide evidence of the diffusion of global stan-
dards through norms-making institutions such as an
international agency. They also suggest that encouraging
and supporting countries in the adoption of prequalifica-
tion programs has been beneficial to quality of public
systems in small and developing countries. But if there
has been headway in prequalification programs, it must
be said that limits are clear. Quality regulation does not
have feedback across public and private markets and
sometimes is cross-matched. Our findings demonstrate
no relationship between the adoption of global standards
for public pharmaceutical markets and for private
markets. That is to say, states that establish rules for
transparency of standards in their private pharmaceutical
markets are no more likely to set standards for public
purchasing systems and vice versa. For example, our re-
sults suggest that compared across the cohort, Lesoto is
very good at regulating the public market but not very
good at regulating the private market. By contrast,
Estonia is good at regulating the private market but not
good at regulating the public market. This seems con-
sistent with the narrative of medical system development
in these countries. Lesoto has been shaped by exogenous
interventions, its public market emerged out of co-
purchases with international institutions which
demanded prequalification standards. Estonia and other
Eastern European states were strongly shaped by speedy
privatization and private market change in the wake of
the transition from communism [50]. This paper works
to see the forest for the trees, but we are acutely aware
that each tree has been shaped by its unique particular-
ities of sun and soil. We must work to understand how
regulatory systems in developing countries are evolving
and what impact they might have on access to medicine
for its citizens.
The results presented here make an important contribu-
tion to our understanding of patterns in global regulatory
diffusion. Scholarship in this area has emphasized two
models for norm expansion. One suggests that the key vari-
able in the expansion of global norms is through regional
mechanisms. Another is that important global players es-
tablish rules that then are, either through processes of
“closeness” to global norm builders [51]. The underlying
causes of “bureaucratization” or “rationalization” of the
state apparatus as DiMaggio and Powell so famously de-
scribed regulatory standardization in the 1980s [52] appears
in the case of the globalization of pharmaceutical standards
to have far less reach. Instead our findings suggest that
there is little evidence of developing countries moving to-
ward one global pharmaceutical norm. Across this sample
of countries, important variations remain across all indices.
This is puzzling given that global pharmaceutical norms for
intellectual property standards have reshaped the rules
form ownership of drugs in developing counties [53].13
That the countries surveyed here have harmonized their
pharmaceutical sectors to a global norm for patent rights,
but resisted to either instate basic standards for pharma-
ceutical product entry and oversight is an interesting
anomaly in story of health norms globalization. These re-
sults call for more research to unravel why there is state
resistance or adherence to emerging regulatory norms and
what implications of significant inter and inter-country
variations in the regulation of pharmaceuticals might have
for global health standards, open pharmaceutical markets,
and access to medicines of quality standards to citizens of
the developing world?
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Conclusions
In this paper, we offer three Indices of pharmaceutical
market oversight, cross-weighted to allow for the most
inclusive global study (we are aware of ) comparing 78
small and developing countries with regulatory data col-
lected by the World Health Organization (WHO). To
build our Indices, we draw on item response theory
(IRT) to reduce multiple observed indicators into latent
variables that represent the three discrete aspects of
regulation. The elements included from the survey are
widely held to be the best practices in an effective regu-
latory system. How widely held are these practices? Our
metrics allow us to breakdown and compare pharma-
ceutical market regulation across publics and private
market monitoring systems. The first index measures
the existence of basic “State Regulatory Infrastructure.”
The second index assesses the degree of statutory con-
trol over private transactions: “Monitoring the Private
Market”. The third index, “Public Quality Control,” eval-
uates the existence of polices associated with high stan-
dards of control of the public pharmaceutical market.
No indicator can be a complete reflection of an over-
sight system. Like the Ginarte and Park [54, 55] index of
intellectual property, our instrument does not endeavor
to illustrate how well systems are enforced, but it is a
marker of how regulatory systems are moving toward
one model or splintering into diverse systems.
Building on the Indices, our paper concludes with
three main results: First, we show tremendous global
variation. Global pharmaceutical standards are in a mo-
ment of fracture. In contrast to the nearly complete
harmonization of legal systems for patent ownership at a
global level, a universal norm for pharmaceutical legisla-
tion is yet to emerge. Second, when there are changes to
systems, they appear to occur in starts and fits. There is
no smoothness across public and private markets. Some
countries have private markets at a more advanced regu-
latory states and others lead their market reform and
oversight from their public sectors. As shown in the
contrasting cases of Lesotho and Estonia, reforms of
pharmaceutical markets are part of a story both of the
public (and sometimes global) effort to eliminate disease. It
can also be a story of liberalization and deregulation. That
Eastern Europe both came out of a transition from a com-
munist market system, as deeply affected by the financial
crisis of 2008, and now living in the instability of European
Union speaks to the place of medicine at a cross-roads of
different regulatory systems and institutions.
Finally, our research re-enforces the need for more
comprehensive and comparable inter-temporal informa-
tion on the regulation of pharmaceutics. Little evidence-
based research has been conducted on the variation of
regulation and norms within and across countries, in
part, because the data is not available. By estimating the
first cross-national Indices of pharmaceutical regulation
we provide scholars and policymakers the means to
evaluate a key public health policy in developing coun-
tries. We believe these Indices offer promise and will be
criticised, improved upon and tested. But we are also
very aware that the scope of our index is limited by the
lack of available data. Without better data, we cannot
fully understand how regulatory norms emerge in the
pharmaceutical sector, why significant variation persists
within and between countries, or in what areas specific
groups of countries are falling behind. This research be-
longs in a stream of empirical, data-driven evidence
showing that setting of rules and norms is critical to
protecting the interests of public health.
Endnotes
1A recent exception can be found in a quasi-experimental
study conducted in Sarajevo which surveyed the clinical
decision to administer drugs for critically ill patients
evaluating of cost and quality [56].
2A select number of case studies offer insights into
particular countries, but there are, as we know of at this
time, no global or regional-level quantitative studies. For
a recent study on the structures underpinning the
Japanese generic market, see Jakovljevic et al. [57].
3Important work on this can be found in a decade-old
review of generic policies in Latin America by Homedes,
Linares and Ugalde which finds significant variation in
the mere definition of what precisely is a generic
pharmaceutical product [58].
4Country situation reports were downloaded from http://
www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/coordination_
assessment/en/index1.html. Additional file 1 has a list of
countries used in this study.
5The authors recognize that different administrative
traditions may have different approaches to resolving the
same problem and the indicators may miss assess certain
aspects of a government’s policies. This is a problem
with almost all large scale indicators.
6The datasets supporting the conclusions of this article
are available in the Harvard dataverse repository, found
at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=
doi:10.7910/DVN/KOM12J.
7Bayesian sampling methods are implemented by a
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) model using the
MCMCpack in R [38]. We constrain one item to have a
positive loading. To ensure convergence and stationary
of all estimated parameters, after discarding the initial
60,000 iterations as a burn-in, we run at least 15,000,000
iterations and keep every 100th scan in our posterior
sample. Two dimensional latent trait models were also
estimated, but they provided no additional information
and are not presented here.
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8Whether the government publishes National Good
Pharmacy Practices Guidelines (5.05.11) and whether
legal provisions establish the powers of the MRA
(5.01.01) respectively represent the lower and upper
values.
9The low Regulatory Infrastructure scores for Kuwait,
Oman, and Qatar may be the result f the Gulf Cooperation
Council deciding to institute a centralized regulatory sys-
tem in 2009, which is obsessively dominated by Saudi
Arabia.
10Given that many developing countries simply accept
the pre-qualification results of developed countries or
those of the WHO, one could argue that having a pre-
qualification program provides no evidence of having a
strong national regulatory system.
11One notable example was the controversial port seiz-
ure of generic HIV/AIDS medicine destined for Africa,
withheld by the Netherlands spurring a wave of public
and diplomatic outcry. The importance of ensuring ac-
cess to anti-retroviral medicine has been discussed by
Wang et al. [59].
12There is a 48 % probability one of these countries
has the highest latent value among all 78 countries.
13We are keenly aware that other pressures beyond
harmonization of IPR have reshaped the market for
medicine in developing countries in recent years. Recent
work on the Serbian market for example, has shown
how macroeconomic changes have affected the supply of
effective drugs only to be further riled by the global
financial crisis [21, 47].
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